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TOTAL NATURAL RESOURCE RENTS  
(AS % OF GDP) (2015): 
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NATIONAL EXTRACTIVES COMPANY: 
Botswana Oil Limited and Debswana (in a joint 
venture with the South African diamond company 
De Beers)
UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX VALUE (2016): 
0.698 (Global Rank 108)3
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The Government of Botswana managed 
to successfully negotiate a sophisticated 
downstream beneficiation agreement with its 
main partner, De Beers. The most important 
success factor was its exceptional bargaining 
power at the time of negotiation, which arose 
from a combination of three factors: 1) the loss in 
market power of De Beers, 2) the high reliance of 
De Beers on Botswana for its revenues and rough 
diamond supply, and 3) the need to negotiate the 
renewal of the licence. 
2BACKGROUND ON BOTSWANA’S 
DIAMOND SECTOR
The large Orapa kimberlite deposit was discovered 
shortly after independence in 1966. In 1982, the 
second mine that opened at Jwaneng was even 
richer and larger. According to the European 
Centre for Development Policy Management, 
“Jwaneng is commonly reputed to be ‘the richest 
piece of real estate on earth’ where the operating 
costs to extract a dollar of diamonds over the 
first 25 years of its life has been USD $0.10.”4 
Indeed, the country is endowed with “with easily 
accessible surface deposits of high quality 
stones.”5 To operate these mines, De Beers and 
the government established Debswana (previously 
called the De Beers Botswana Mining Company) 
as a joint venture in 1969, with the government 
holding a 15 per cent stake in the company. This 
share increased to 50 per cent in 1975.6 Today 
Debswana operates four diamond mines, including 
the world-class deposits of Orapa and Jwaneng. 
New producers such as Lucara have started 
lucrative mining operations without a government 
equity share.7 As of 2011, Debswana produces 22 
per cent of the world’s diamond output and has a 
major impact on Botswana’s economy. It makes 
up around 70 per cent of the country’s export 
4 Grynberg, R. (2013). Some like them rough: The future of diamond beneficiation in Botswana (ECDPM Discussion Paper 142). Retrieved from http://
ecdpm.org/publications/future-of-diamond-benefication-in-botswana/
5 Morris, M., Kaplinsky, R. & Kaplan, D. (2011). Commodities and linkages: Industrialisation in Sub Saharan Africa (MMCP Discussion Paper). Milton 
Keynes and Cape Town, The Open University and University of Cape Town. Retrieved from http://oro.open.ac.uk/30048/
6 De Beers website. Retrieved from www.debeers.com
7 Jwaneng and Orapa represent 92 per cent of the country’s diamond output measured by value- See Zimnisky, P. (2017). 2017 global natural 
diamond production forecasted at 142M carats worth $15.6B. Mining.com. Retrieved from http://www.mining.com/web/2017-global-natural-diamond-
production-forecasted-142m-carats-worth-15-6b
8 Mbayi, L. (2011). Linkages in Botswana’s diamond cutting and polishing industry (MMCP Discussion Paper No. 6). Cape Town, South Africa, and Milton 
Keynes, UK: University of Cape Town and Open University. Retrieved from http://www.prism.uct.ac.za/Papers/MMCP%20Paper%206_0.pdf
9 Grynberg (2013), Id. note 4.
earnings, 30 per cent of GDP and 50 per cent of 
government revenues.8
Thanks to the bonanza of diamond revenues, 
sound macroeconomic management and a fiscally 
responsible expenditure strategy, Botswana 
evolved from being one of the poorest countries 
at independence to middle-income status by 
the mid-1990s. During this period, the economy 
grew at an average rate of 8 per cent per annum, 
and to a large extent, Botswana has been able 
to avoid the so-called “resource curse” that 
is prevalent in other resource-rich countries. 
However, since 2000 there 
have been no significant new 
discoveries of diamonds and 
economic growth has fallen 
to 4 per cent (below the sub-
Saharan African average), with 
high unemployment rates.9 
To cope with this downturn, 
the government launched 
a diversification policy 
largely anchored on diamond 
beneficiation. This industry is now the largest 
manufacturing subsector in the country and 
employs 3,000 people. 
CONTEXT FOR NEGOTIATING 
THE DOWNSTREAM PACKAGE 
WITH DE BEERS
The cooperation between De Beers and the 
government on its downstream beneficiation 
policy changed due to the market position of De 
Beers. For a long time, De Beers dominated sales 
and marketing of diamonds both in Botswana and 
around the world: “Historically, De Beers was able to 
Jwaneng is commonly reputed to 
be “the richest piece of real estate 
on earth.”
3control the entire industry from mine to consumer 
through its dominant position in the upstream 
industry which, at its peak, saw 
De Beers control over 80 per cent 
of the world’s rough diamond 
supply.”10 Global diamond supply 
mostly originated from Southern 
Africa where De Beers owned 
a near monopoly of production. 
Through a single marketing 
channel, De Beers controlled prices 
of the entire industry.  
When the Government of 
Botswana approached De Beers to 
develop in-country beneficiation 
in the 1980s the company 
claimed that cutting and polishing 
activities were not commercially 
viable in the country. Following 
government pressure, De Beers 
established three cutting and polishing factories, 
but none of them became viable. Some observers 
claim that De Beers purposefully made them 
unprofitable to avoid further pressure.11
However, another window of opportunity opened in 
the 2000s when De Beers’s mining licences were 
set to expire. At the time, De Beers’s monopoly 
power and share of global diamond trade had 
plummeted because of competition from new 
producers in other regions of the world (see Figure 
1). In order to stay competitive, the company had 
to renew its Botswana licences. The government’s 
bargaining position was strong, considering that 
70 per cent of De Beers’s profits and 60 per cent 
of De Beers’s supply of rough diamonds came from 
Botswana, based on the two exceptional deposits 
in Orapa and Jawaneng. Against this backdrop, 
the good relationship with the Government of 
Botswana became critical to the existence of De 
Beers, and the company’s imperative was to keep 
control of the mines.12
10 Mbayi (2011), Id. note 8.
11 Morris, Kaplinsky, & Kaplan (2011), Id. note
12 Grynberg (2013), Id. note 4.
13 Mbayi (2011), Id. note 8.
14 Moffat, B. (2017). Best practice? Managing natural resources (diamonds) in Botswana: Some notes. Botswana Journal of Business 10(1), Special 
Issue: 50th Anniversary Special Issue. Retrieved from http://journals.ub.bw/index.php/bjb/article/view/958
Figure 1. Decline of De Beers market share from 
the 1990s to 2011
Source: As cited in Grynberg, 2015.
Thus in 2005, the Government of Botswana 
succeeded in negotiating with De Beers that a 
set amount of rough diamonds from Debswana 
be allocated to Botswana-based cutting and 
polishing companies. After the agreement was 
reached, the government invited cutting and 
polishing companies from all over the world to set 
up factories in the country on the condition that 
they would transfer cutting and polishing skills to 
locals. In total, 16 international companies, called 
the “sightholders” were selected and licensed in 
Botswana. Their guaranteed allocation of supply 
of rough diamonds depended on the following 
criteria: “global competitiveness criteria, which 
assesses technical; marketing and distribution 
efficiency; as well as local criteria, which sought 
to promote skills development; job creation; and 
local manufacturing.”13 The 16 sightholders (which 
are now 2114) received aggregated parcels of 
rough diamonds from all over the world through De 
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Source: European Commission (De Beers – LVMH Decision 2001 Official Journal of the 
European Commission), De Beers Annual Reports, RBC, Author’s estimates.
4IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
DOWNSTREAM POLICY
De Beers and the government established a 
50/50 joint venture called the Diamond Trading 
Company (DTC) Botswana in 2008 with the 
tasks of 1) sorting and valuing Debswana’s rough 
diamonds, 2) selling and marketing diamonds 
to the 16 local cutting and polishing companies, 
and 3) supporting and developing the cutting 
and polishing industry. DTC Botswana’s sales 
to the local cutting and polishing industry were 
determined to be USD 500 million worth of 
diamonds a year, with sales growing over time. 
Target employment creation of sightholders 
was set at 3,000. The timeline for these targets 
was not stipulated in the contract, but a penalty 
clause for non-performance was included. The 
government established a Diamond Office to 
support the downstream policy objectives. It 
was responsible for building strategic alliances, 
developing infrastructure and enabling a 
favourable fiscal regime. The office was located at 
Diamond Technology Park, which 
hosted ancillary businesses 
including banking, logistics, 
gemmology, security and 
brokering companies.15
In the 2005 negotiation for the 
renewal of the licence, De Beers 
also agreed to progressively 
move its aggregation 
business—selecting and mixing 
the diamonds from De Beers 
mines for its customers—from 
London to Gaborone. This move 
was completed in 2013. The hope was to create 
horizontal spillovers to service industries such 
as hospitality, finance and transportation, given 
that diamond buyers would now have to go to 
Gaborone to buy De Beers’s diamonds.16
15 Mbayi (2011), Id. note 8.
16 Morris, Kaplinsky, & Kaplan (2011), Id. note 5.
17 Grynberg (2013), Id. note 4.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
Why did the 16 internationally renowned 
sightholders accept the move to Botswana even 
though polishing and cutting there was more 
expensive? The industry rule of thumb is that 
the cost of cutting and polishing should not 
exceed 10 per cent of the value of the rough.17 
The blue line in Figure 2 adds 10 per cent to the 
cost of imported rough diamonds by Botswana 
(prior to the sorting and aggregation business 
being moved to Gaborone, the country would 
export “unsorted” diamonds and re-import select 
rough diamonds from London) to estimate the 
maximum processing cost that is still viewed to be 
competitive under the industry rule of thumb. The 
red line shows the actual cutting and polishing 
cost in Botswana. Hence there was an implicit 
beneficiation tax in place of around USD 31/carat 
or 4.5 per cent of the value of the rough diamond 
imports in 2009.18
This cost, however, has been outweighed by the 
benefit of gaining long-term access to a relatively 
cheap rough diamond supply. The wholesale price 
of rough diamonds paid by sightholders to De 
Beers is 20 to 30 per cent below market price. In 
addition, they are allowed to process some of the 
allocation of rough diamonds in their factories 
outside of Botswana (in 2008, only 35 per cent 
of the allocated diamonds were processed in the 
country).19 Thus, some sightholders mentioned that 
Why did the 16 internationally 
renowned sightholders accept the 
move to Botswana even though 
polishing and cutting there was 
more expensive?
5even with the high cost of processing in Botswana, 
they continue producing profitably because of 
the existence of cross-subsidization from their 
operations in competitive countries such as 
India and China. The business model relies on the 
continued allocation of rough from De Beers to all 
factories in order to accept the higher processing 
cost in Botswana.20
Figure 2. Estimated unit cost of cutting and 
polishing and the implicit beneficiation tax (USD)
Source: As cited in Grynberg 201521
SUSTAINABILITY OF THE 
DOWNSTREAM POLICY
The downstream policy in Botswana has shown 
clear signs of success. In 2014, the cutting and 
polishing industry in Botswana employed about 
3,750 people with salaries above the manufacturing 
industry’s minimum wage. In addition, employment 
has been created in second-tier supplier industries.
The downstream policy has also shown signs of 
success in moving further downstream in the value 
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Morris, Kaplinsky, & Kaplan (2011), Id. note 5.
23 UNCTAD. (2014). Challenges and opportunities facing land-locked countries (Presentation). Retrieved from http://unctad.org/meetings/en/
Presentation/aldc2014_10_pptBotswana.pdf.
24 Grynberg (2013), Id. note 4.
chain. The vision for diamond beneficiation has 
always gone further than cutting and polishing; it 
has included creating competencies in diamond 
trading, jewellery manufacturing and ancillary 
businesses.22 In 2005, the government secured the 
right to buy a portion of Debswana production (10 
per cent in 2005 and 15 per cent today) that it sells 
on the open market. Domestic trading is further 
incentivized by requiring all new operations to 
sell diamonds in Botswana.23 Furthermore, several 
companies have started manufacturing jewellery. 
While the downstream policy 
has shown signs of success, it is 
challenged by competition from 
Asia. In 2015, the country’s oldest 
diamond cutting and polishing 
company shut down following 
the fall in diamond prices, which 
led to the redundancy of 350 
workers. Botswana is experiencing 
difficulty in competing with 
the low-cost producers in Asia, 
especially India:24 Cutting and 
polishing costs in Botswana are 
three to five times higher than in 
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USD 31.17 per carat 
or 4.5% of unit 
import value
Source: Data on actual costs of cutting come from various Diamond Hub presentations 
2008–2009. The estimated maximum is based on the standard rule of thumb in the industry 
that diamond cutting cost should be no more than 10% of the value of the rough. Rough values 
are based on Botswana import data, Kimberly Process website. http://mmsd.mms.nrcan.gc.ca/
kimberleystats/public_tables/Annual%20Summary%20Table%202008.pdf
Estimated Maximum Cost of Processing
Estimated Average Actual Costs of Cutting and Polishing
Implicit Beneficiation Tax
6Table 1. Global cutting and polishing costs 
Source. Frost & Sullivan, 2014.25
Israel and Belgium have managed to maintain 
their market presence by developing niche 
expertise in cutting and polishing larger and more 
valuable stones, leaving the low-wage/low-cost 
economies such as India and China to produce 
cheaper stones for which the polishing cost 
makes up a larger margin of the final sales price. 
Botswana is positioned on the mid-level quality 
market, and as such has good prospects to remain 
competitive for a while.26 The government is also 
investing heavily in training, which will increase 
the productivity of the polishing factories. That 
said, the introduction of computer numerically 
controlled cutting and polishing technologies will 
disrupt the global markets and potentially defeat 
the competitive advantage of having a skilled 
workforce for this type of activity. 
Unfortunately, De Beers’s decision to cooperate 
with Botswana regarding diamond processing 
was very late in the economic life of the 
country’s known diamond deposits. If De Beers 
had embarked on this strategy in the 1980s the 
country would have had 20 more years to develop 
and benefit from the cutting and polishing skills. 
25 Frost and Sullivan Consulting. (2014). Grown diamonds: Unlocking future of diamond industry by 2050. Retrieved from http://www.scarabaeus.li/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Frost_Sullivan_Grown_Diamond_Impact_2050.pdf.
26 Grynberg (2013), Id. note 4.
27 Ibid.
Instead, Botswana is pursuing 
downstream beneficiation at 
a time when its reserves are in 
decline.27 It remains to be seen 
how the implicit beneficiation 
tax will be compensated 
once diamond deposits are 
depleted, which is expected 
to occur in 30 to 40 years. 
Given the competition with 
Asia and the introduction of 
new technologies, without 
an effective plan to lower 
processing costs, the cutting 
and polish industry is likely to 
leave the country once it loses 
access to the guaranteed and inexpensive supply 
of rough diamonds. 
De Beer’s aggregation business is however now 
in Botswana, and Botswana’s downstream vision 
includes the development of retail capabilities. 
If this vision is realized, the degree of domestic 
value-added will continue to rise as retail makes 
up the largest proportion of the final market 
product value (see Table 2).
Table 2. Value addition across the diamond value 
chain 
Stage of Global Value Chain % of original value
Producer Selling Value 100
Sorting and Valuing 115





Stage of Global Value Chain % of original value
Producer Selling Value 100
Sorting and Valuing 115
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KEY LESSONS 
• Botswana articulated a vision to move 
beyond diamond extraction and then crafted 
a strategy to implement this vision.
• At the core of this strategy, the government 
established dedicated institutions (DTC 
Botswana and the Diamond Office), an 
industrial park (the Diamond Technology 
Park) to provide the necessary infrastructure 
for moving downstream and a specific 
commercial framework to make the polishing 
industry viable (access to guaranteed and 
cheap long-term rough supply).
•  The success of downstream beneficiation in 
one sector can come at the expense of the 
diversification of the economy. In Botswana, 
the downstream policy has captured a lot 
of public policy efforts, leaving behind other 
sectors of the economy and the development 
of an inclusive private sector-led growth.28 
28 International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2017). Botswana - 2017 Article IV consultation (Press release). Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/en/
Publications/CR/Issues/2017/08/08/Botswana-2017-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-45172.
